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Ethics as Self-Transcendence:
Legal Education, Faith, and an Ethos of Justice
Patrick Brown, ID. ,  Ph D !
Lord, if  I argued my case with you, you would prove to be right.
Yet I must question you about matters of justice. Why are wicked
men so prosperous? Why do dishonest men succeed?
Jeremiah 12:1 I
CALLICLES: I f  you are serious and what you say is true, we shall
have human life turned completely upside down; we are doing, ap-




This conference concerns "pluralism, religion, and the law," and
within that overarching theme members of this panel have been asked to
speak on some aspect of  "ethics, professionalism, and the practice of
law." I  want to use this opportunity to reflect on an aspect of ethics that
is at once basic, far-reaching, and deeply neglected: ethics considered
precisely as the theory and practice of self-transcendence.
Ethics as self-transcendence is basic because it underlies all the var-
ious branches of ethics. I t  is far-reaching because it has implications not
only for personal ethics but also for professional ethics and, indeed, for
the very conditions of legal practice. I t  is neglected because legal aca-
demics generally lack any serious background or training in philosophy.
As a result, the legal-academic discussion of legal ethics tends to mistake
what is obvious in ethics for what ethics obviously is. I t  tends to think
I Distinguished Scholar-in-Residence, Seattle University School of Law.
1. For an exquisite treatment of this passage and its broader context, see RON HANSEN, Afflic-
tion and Grace: Religious Experience in the Poetry of Gerard Manley Hopkins, in A STAY AGAINST
CONFUSION: ESSAYS ON FAITH AND FICTION 115, 115-34 (HarperCollins 2001), especially pages
130-34. See also infra note 11 and the context intimated there.
2. PLATO, GORGIAS *481 (Walter Hamilton trans., Penguin Books 1960).
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that the essence of ethics is some form of formalism, that is, some judi-
cious combination of easily apprehended concepts and readily enforce-
able rules. While such formalism may represent the external form of
some varieties of ethics, it  is hardly the inner core of  ethics, and it is
hardly the best vehicle for  professional formation or for fostering a
commitment to justice.
My thesis, then, is simple and, I trust, audacious. Ethics is funda-
mentally about ethos, attitude, one's grounded stance or existential orien-
tation, not the extrinsicism of concepts or the formalism of rules. Ethics
concerns not just any orientation, but that intimate and demanding form
of personal development manifested in the experience and practice of
self-transcendence. Conversely , the neglect o f  ethics as  self-
transcendence introduces deep distortions into the way we socialize stu-
dents into notions of ethics and professionalism. I t  introduces subse-
quent distortions into the conditions of legal practice. I t  encourages a
superficial and extrinsic minimalism. I t  encourages, in effect, the disas-
trous conception of legal ethics as ethical legalism.
The sources of these distortions are complex, and I cannot hope to
explore them fully here. But I hope to explore, briefly and suggestively,
the notion of ethics as self-transcendence and its relation to the sponta-
neous human quest for happiness, to religious faith, and to fostering an
ethos of justice. I  begin by considering the role of what I take to be the
standard model of legal pedagogy in engendering and perpetuating cer-
tain distortions concerning objectivity, value, and the good. I  then de-
scribe and explore a basic, non-minimalist, and non-formalist notion of
ethics centering on the notions of  orientation, self-transcendence, and
self-constitution; such a view of ethics might serve as a counterpoise to
some of the defective notions implicit in the standard model of legal pe-
dagogy. Next, I describe a heuristic model of four levels of happiness,
which adds dialectical nuances to the basic account of ethics. I  conclude
with some brief reflections on the role of faith in promoting an ethos of
justice.
LEGAL PEDAGOGY AND A CRISIS OF THE PROFESSION?
I want to speak first about a tension within the standard model of
legal pedagogy. I n  important ways, legal education operates at cross-
purposes with itself. On the one hand, it likes to think of itself as a sub-
lime embodiment of critical and skeptical rationality, heir to Socrates
himself and his spirit of restless and probing inquiry. On the other hand,
legal education likes to think of itself as an active promoter of important
objective values like honesty, integrity, professionalism, perhaps even
something called justice. On the one hand, legal education sees itself as
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serving an end beyond mere practicality. On the other hand, legal educa-
tion is relentlessly instrumental. Legal education prides itself on its
skepticism, yet it is incompletely skeptical, for it is skeptical of every-
thing but its own skepticism. Legal education prides itself on its civic-
mindedness and professionalism, yet it is incompletely civic-minded and
professional, for its undifferentiated skepticism leaves its students no
grounds for affirming important objective civic and professional values.
I will say more about this apparent schizophrenia in a moment. For
now, I simply want to note that it subtly affects or afflicts the ethos of the
legal academy and the atmosphere of law school. I t  impacts our received
notions of professionalism, ethics, and their relation to the practice of
law. And it even affects our ethos of justice, which is either formed, de-
formed, or left culpably unformed by the professional womb we call law
school. Our notions of professionalism and ethics within the practice of
law do not spring into being ex nihilo; they are formed (and, I will argue,
also partly deformed) when we are socialized and acculturated into the
law as law students.
This tension remains generally unnoticed, even in the rest of the
academic world. The view from the outside is that, of course, law school
is centrally concerned with justice. My  colleagues in the philosophy and
theology departments at Seattle University are generally amazed when I
tell them that law school is not a three-year program of studies about jus-
tice. N o t  ever having been to law school, they quite naturally believe
that law is about justice, and so, of course, law school must be a long
training in thinking rigorously about the nature and practice of justice.
When I tell them that law school is mainly about technical training in
matters such as the Uniform Commercial Code, the law of  contracts,
torts, c iv il procedure, bankruptcy, land use, administrative law, and so
on, they are mildly surprised. When I tell them that "justice" is rarely
even mentioned in most law school courses, they are openly incredulous.
When I tell them that ethics in the law, taught under the rubric of "Pro-
fessional Responsibility," is mainly about learning the minimal rules one
needs to observe in order to avoid being disbarred, they are simply
stunned. Surely, an ethics curriculum in a discipline such as law, which
is so central to our social, cultural, and political systems, might aim
higher than merely communicating to students such profound and non-
obvious ethical precepts as "thou shalt not sleep with thy clients" and
"thou shalt not commingle thy clients' and thine own checking ac-
counts."
Professional responsibility courses and precepts are perfectly nec-
essary, of course, but are they sufficient? Does an implicit or explicit
ethical minimalism get things upside down? Even if  it did, what would
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be the alternative? Theoretical ethics is as contested and conflicted a
zone as any other area in the modern academy. I s  running students
through the whole gamut of conflicting opinions in theoretical ethics the
only alternative to a rules-based minimalism? The question is an impor-
tant one. As  anyone familiar with the contemporary conditions of legal
practice will tell you—and this claim will resonate with you far more if
you have practiced law in a large firm within the last ten or fifteen
years—"we are doing, apparently, the complete opposite of  what we
ought."
Indeed, I sometimes suspect that if  my colleagues outside the law
school were fully informed on what happens in law school and contem-
porary legal practice, they might be tempted to exclaim with Henry Ad-
ams, when he was reflecting on his education at Harvard, that "the chief
wonder of education is that it does not ruin everybody concerned in it,
teachers and taught."
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here is that law school pedagogy is not neutral; it is not 'value free' in
the sense of the term often attributed to Max Weber, and we should stop
pretending that it  is. H ow  legal education is structured has important
implications for what counts as "ethical" in legal practice, and it  has
enormous implications concerning the survival of the ideal of  "profes-
sionalism" in the practice of law!' Beyond that, it has implications for
the survival of idealism and religious faith as sources of ethical orienta-
tion and praxis within legal practice.
Despite its aspirations to neutrality and objectivity—or perhaps
precisely because of them—law school is a carrier of values, an envi-
ronmental or professional womb from which emerge the legal world-
views of its students. But law school pedagogy is not neutral and it can-
not be neutral. I t  may be "objective," but only if  one naïvely misunder-
stands objectivity to exclude subjectivity, that is, the actual operations of
our minds, the actual aspirations of our spirits ( if I may dare to use such a
word within the hallowed, or perhaps hollowed, halls of the legal acad-
emy).
Whatever else it  may also be, law school is the actual formative
process through which law students are inducted willy-nilly  into the
world of meanings and values mediated by legal institutions and legal
practice. Whatever else it is, it is not merely neutral or flatly objective in
some naïve and undifferentiated sense. There is no such thing as a view-
3. HENRY ADAMS, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 55 (Houghton
Mifflin 2000) (1918).
4. See the compact but penetrating suggestions by Fred Lawrence in Human Voice and Democ-
ratic Political Culture: The Crisis of True Professionalism, 66 TEX. L. REV. 641 (1988).
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pointless viewpoint,
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G.K. Chesterton once wrote, "every education teaches a philosophy; i f
not by dogma then by suggestion, by implication, by atmosphere."
6 Chesterton is  speaking about the ethos explicitly or  implic itly
communicated by any educational system. But what is the specific ethos
communicated by law school? What is the philosophy that it teaches by
suggestion, by implication, by atmosphere, and perhaps by dogma? And
how does that influence the professionalism that permeates (or is absent
from) the concrete conditions of legal practice? Is  it an ethos of justice,
as my colleagues in the philosophy and theology departments always
initially assume? O r  is it something else, perhaps an ethos of techno-
cratic or instrumental rationality, which by its restricted terms creates
and sustains a kind of reflexive skepticism towards substantive goods or
values?
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ethos which eclectically blends technical proficiency, substantive values
such as a respect for rights based on a more or less Lockean or Kantian
or pragmatist viewpoint, combined with a basic agnosticism regarding
any set of ends or goods which claim to somehow eliminate what seems
in fact an inelimanable pluralism concerning the ends or goals or pur-
poses of law?
These questions concern perennially complex and contentious is-
sues. While I do not propose to solve them here, I think some perspec-
tive on these issues can be gleaned by noticing two things. First, we all
embody or live out of some basic, operative view of the good—a phi-
losophy in the loose sense—and that includes law professors and practi-
tioners! We choose what we choose for a reason, both individually and
collectively, and generally those reasons are embedded in some image or
understanding of a larger moral, social, cultural, or religious order.
9
5. The standard, unconscious response to this statement invites the conclusion that therefore all
viewpoints are simply co-planar. Bu t  this inference is neither logically required nor empirically
plausible. Onl y  i f  there were no such thing as development within viewpoints or  between view-
points would it follow that all viewpoints are co-planar. And i f it were the case that all viewpoints
are simply co-planar, then the viewpoint that all viewpoints are co-planar would itself be co-planar
with the viewpoint that they are not—that is to say, it would be incoherent or self-refuting.
6. GILBERT K. CHESTERTON, AS I WAS SAYING: A CHESTERTON READER 179 (Robert Knille
ed., William B. Eerdmans Publ'g Co. 1985).
7. For a now-classic account of this topic, see Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the
Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 247 (1978), especially pages 253-59.
8. See, e.g., Leslie Pickering Francis, Law and Philosophy: From Skepticism to Value Theory,
27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 65, 65 (1993) ("[R]ecognized or not, philosophy is part of the ordinary life of
law schools and lawyers. Images of the methods of philosophy shape accounts of legal education
and legal reasoning.").
9. For  a  sophisticated view o f  this issue, see CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIAL
IMAGWARIEs (Duke Univ. Press 2(n04), especially pages 8-9, ("What an understanding of  moral
order adds to an awareness and acceptance of norms is an identification of features of the world or
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Second, the legal academy is  essentially schizophrenic toward
questions of the good.
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sionalism and all the other values with which we imbue our students. On
the oth r hand, the basic stance of the Socratic Method, as traditionally
practiced by law professors, often leaves students with nothing more than
a kind of residual, undifferentiated skepticism. Students become techni-
cally proficient at generating arguments for and against various policy
claims or value stances, it is true, but the acquisition of this skill often
leaves them stripped of whatever moral common sense they may have
possessed when they entered law school." Students may retain personal
values, but these are essentially privatized, aestheticized, and anaesthe-
tized. After all, everyone knows that "value judgments" are merely sub-
jective.
But what "everyone knows" in this context turns out to be a more
r less unexamined story or  narrative about the absoluteness o f  the
fact/value dichotomy—less the product of serious or sustained theoretic
reflection on the nature of ethics than a watered-down popular version of
Hume, or Nietzsche, or Weber.
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divine action or human life that make certain norms both right and (up to the point indicated) realiz-
ble. I n  other words, the image of order carries a definition not only of what is right, but of the
context in which it makes sense to strive for and hope to realize the right (at least partially).").
10. See Samuel J. Levine, Introductory Note: Symposium on Lawyering and Personal Values—
Responding to the Problems of Ethical Schizophrenia, 38 CATH. LAW. 145, 146 (1998).
11. Many law students complain with some frequency that law school makes them feel like
they have been gutted of the idealism that brought them to law school, or that it makes them feel that
their souls have been stripped from them. I  had one bright and idealistic student last year who de-
scribed law school, rather feelingfully, as "a soul-sucking hell-hole." Perhaps that is an extreme
formulation, but a growing body of literature suggests that my student was onto something. See
Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Role o f  Legal Education in Producing Psychological Distress
Among Law Students and Lawyers, 11 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 225, 246 (1986) (noting that data
shows law students experience heightened levels of "obsessive-compulsive behavior, interpersonal
sensitivity, depression, anxiety, hostility, phobic anxiety, paranoid ideation, and psychoticism (social
alienation and isolation)"); Susan Daicoff, Articles Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical
Research on Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 Am. U. L. REv. 1337 (1997); Pat-
rick J. Schlitz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and
Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871,872-81 (1999), James R. P. Ogloff et al., More Than
"Learning to Think Like a Lawyer:" The Empirical Research on Legal Education, 34 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 73 (2000); Lawrence S. Krieger, Institutional Denial About the Dark Side of Law School, and
Fresh Empirical Guidance for Constructively Breaking the Silence, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 112, 114-15
(2002) (referring to a 1990 study by researchers at Johns Hopkins); Angela McCaffrey, The Healing
Presence of Clients in Law School, 30 Wm. MITCHELL L. REV. 87, 95 (2003) (citing an earlier study
by Sheldon and Krieger); Kennon M. Sheldon & Lawrence S. Krieger, Does Legal Education Have
Undermining Effects on Law Students? Evaluating Changes in Motivation, Values, and Well-being,
22 BEHAN/. Sa. & L. 261 (2004).
12. See TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 23 ("There are important differences between social imagi-
nary and social theory. I  adopt the term imaginary (i) because my focus is on the way ordinary
people 'imagine' their social surroundings, and this is often not expressed in theoretical terms, but is
carried in images, stories, and legends. i t  is also the case that (ii) theory is often the possession of a
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question the received wisdom regarding the fact/value dichotomy," it is
solidly entrenched in the "social imaginary," as Charles Taylor calls it,
which governs legal pedagogy. I n  a classic passage, Karl Llewellyn
suggested to first year students that law school "aims, in the old phrase,
to get you 'thinking like a lawyer.' The hardest job of the first year is to
lop off your common sense, to knock your ethics into temporary anesthe-
sia.. along with woozy thinking."
14 At any rate, after launching students on their merry way into prac-
tice with this suggestion, implication, atmosphere, or dogma (as Chester-
ton would say), we then expect them to be fine, upstanding members of
the bar: professional, civil, courteous, diligent, honest, and willing to
avoid "offensive personalities" and to swear to "never reject, from any
consideration personal to myself, the cause of  the defenseless or op-
small minority, whereas what is interesting in the social imaginary is that it is shared by large groups
of people, i f  not the whole society. Which leads to a third difference: (iii) the social imaginary is
that common understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of
legitimacy.").
13. Here again, the literature is vast, but one might start with HILARY PUTNAM, THE COLLAPSE
OF THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY AND OTHER ESSAYS (Harvard Univ. Press 2002) or the massive
and magisterial CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE (Harvard Univ. Press 2007). For  a critique of
the fact/value dichotomy from a Marxist perspective of  the primacy of praxis, see Louis DUPRE,
MARX'S SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF CULTURE 1-14, 58-108, 276-88 (Yale Univ. Press 1985).
The full historical and philosophical genealogy of this syndrome is extremely complex. The
problem also goes by the name of  "the subject/object split" or "the self/world divide." HUSTON
SMITH, WHY RELIGION MATTERS: THE PATE OF THE HUMAN SPIRIT IN AN AGE OF DISBELIEF 256
-57 (HarperCollins 2001). See also MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 363 (John Macquarrie &
Edward Robinson trans., Blackwell Publ'g 1978) (1927) (critiquing the notion of beginning from "a
worldless '1' in order to provide this ' I'  with an Object"); id. at 254 (critiquing the fact that "Des-
cartes, on the contrary, says that cogitationes are present-at-hand, and that in these an ego is present-
at-hand too as a worldless res cogirans"). Human being-in-the-world is moral and religious from the
start. See, e.g., ROBERT COLES, THE SPIRITUAL LIFE OF CHILDREN (Houghton Mifflin 1990);
ROBERT COLES, THE MORAL INTELLIGENCE OF CHILDREN (Random House 1997).
Still, progress in understanding these issues does not necessarily depend on successfully ingest-
ing large amounts of arcane philosophical theory. Consider, for example, Richard Mitchell's pene-
trating and bracing satire in RICHARD MITCHELL, THE LEANING TOWER OF BABEL AND OTHER
AFFRONTS BY THE UNDERGROUND GRAMMARIAN 128 (Little, Brown 1984) ("But philosophy does
count, even in the most practical matters, especially in the most practical matters. Al l  we have to do
to make people ignorant and gullible is persuade them into a silly epistemology.").
14. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 39 (Oceana
Publ'ns 1960) (1930). 1 think Llewellyn's point is fairly obvious: Effective law school pedagogy
requires at a minimum a re-tutoring of the "common sense" with which students enter law school.
Very few people would deny that to become effective practitioners, law students must somehow
learn to think dialectically about their own assumptions, in roughly the manner in which the unfortu-
nate interlocutors in the Socratic dialogues had to learn to re-think the assumptions they happened to
have brought to the dialogue. But  1 see little sustained reflection in the legal professoriate on how
such a delicate surgery is best accomplished. Mainly, law professors tend to think that the version of
the Socratic Method modeled by their own professors in law school suffices. Yet the simple expedi-
ent of administering a dose of ethical "anesthesia" without the appropriately skillful surgical opera-
tion somehow seems less than fully adequate.
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students' "ethics into temporary anesthesia" turns out to be not so tempo-
rary.
I may appear to be laying a great deal of blame at the door of the
legal academy, when in fact the legal academy largely just reflects the
unconscious philosophical and cultural assumptions of our time, our gen-
eral "climate of opinion,"
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dich tomy has settled into our shared image of moral or cultural or social
order, that fact and its questionable value surely have implications for
how we envision the ethical landscape involved in the practice of law.
This is an ancient, oft-rehearsed complaint, one around which a vast
literature has accreted, and one that has been around in one way or an-
other since the time of Plato." Yet any attempt to speak about ethics in a
legal practice context must take this pedagogical dimension into account.
What is desperately needed in legal pedagogy, I would say, is some no-
tion of the possibility of fulfillment and flourishing within the practice of
the profession. Put differently, what is needed is some possibility of, and
intimation of, an ethos of professionalism, an ethos of justice, an ethos of
service, which is not from the start misdirected by a merely instrumental
understanding of  the role and function of  the craft of  lawyering and
which is not burdened and blinkered by a shrunken sense of what law is
and what lawyers strive for in practicing law.
A BASIC NOTION OF ETHICS
So far I have suggested that legal education and legal practice ap-
pear to suffer from something like an ethics deficit or, at least, that they
labor under some key unexamined assumptions concerning the very na-
ture of ethics. I  have also suggested that the deficit and the assumptions
adversely affect the ethos of the profession and that any renewed sense of
fulfillment and flourishing within the practice of law may depend on a
15. WASH. ST. ADMISSION TO PRAC. R. 5(e) (oath of admission to the Washington State Bar).
16. The phrase was made famous by Whitehead. See ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE
AND THE MODERN WORLD 3 (1925). See also CARL LOTUS BECKER, THE HEAVENLY CITY OF THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY PHILOSOPHERS (Yale Univ. Press 1932), especially chapter one.
17. See PLATO, supra note 2. Note that while the dialogue appears to be about the nature of
"oratory" or "rhetoric," i t is (in part) really about the defective educational schemes and orientations
of the ancient Greek professionals who aimed to help their students acquire "the ability to convince
by means of speech a jury in a court of justice," id. at *452, and the ability "to produce the kind of
conviction needed in courts of law," id. at *454, and it concerns the proper or improper "use of ora-
tory, like people in the law courts," id. at *471. An adequate reading of the Gorgias requires one to
read it as a Greek drama, not just a source for conceptual or logical contents. See also James Boyd
White, The Ethics of  Argument: Plato's Gorgias and the Modern Lawyer, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 849,
872 (1983) ("Indeed, i f  what Socrates says about ancient rhetoric and its practitioners is true, how
can it not be equally true of modem law and modem lawyers?").
2009] E t h i c s  as Self-Transcendence 3 0 1
 broader and deeper notion of ethics than the one normally and tacitly
assumed in legal education. Now let me briefly sketch the rudiments that
I believe comprise such a broader and deeper notion.
What is ethics about? In its most compact and basic form, ethics is
about three things. First, it is about the deep human longing for what one
can only call orientation. This longing is "deeper and more fundamental
than sexuality, deeper than the craving for social power, deeper even
than the desire for possessions"; it is a "more generalized and universal
craving in the human makeup. I t  is the craving for knowledge of the
right direction—for orientation."
18 Second, ethics is about self-transcendence or, as the philosopher
Iris Murdoch once phrased it, ethics is about overcoming "the fat relent-
less ego."
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which the "high world religions" have struggled to convey to their fol-
lowers for centuries.
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not difficult to see a connection between ethics and religious faith. As
she notes,
Moral philosophy is properly, and in the past sometimes has been,
the discussion of this ego and of the techniques ( if any) for its de-
feat. I n  this respect moral philosophy has shared some aims with
religion. To say this is of course also to deny that moral philosophy
should aim at being neutra1.
21Third, ethics is  centrally about the fact that humans constitute
themselves by their deliberations, decisions, and actions. We are in the
abit of saying that we "made a decision," but it is more accurate to say
that our decisions make us. By  choosing various objects or courses of
action, we cumulatively constitute ourselves as genuine or fraudulent,
authentic or inauthentic, human beings.
22
18. SMITH, supra note 13, at 26 (quoting psychologist William Sheldon). See also the comment
by the Jesuit philosopher and theologian Bernard Lonergan: "[M]an's deepest need and most prized
possession is authenticity." BERNARD LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY 254 (The Seabury Press
1979) (1972).
19. Iris Murdoch, On 'God'  and 'Good,' in REVISIONS: CHANGING PERSPECTIVES IN MORAL
PHILOSOPHY 68,72 (Stanley Hauerwas & Alasdair Macintyre eds., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1983)
("In the moral life the enemy is the fat relentless ego.").
20. See Friederich Heiler, The History of Religions as a Preparation for the Co-operation of
Religions, in THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS: ESSAYS IN METHODOLOGY 142,143-44 (Mircea Eliade &
Joseph M. Kitagawa eds., Univ. of Chicago Press 1959); see generally SMITH, supra note 13.
21. Murdoch, supra note 19, at 72-73.
22. Note that I did not use the pair, "successful or unsuccessful." An adequate critique of the
consumerist ideology implicit in the standard notion (or "social imaginary") of "success" in Ameri-
can culture would perhaps require the interdisciplinary talents of Charles Taylor. For a start, though,
see MARTHA BANTA, FAILURE AND SUCCESS IN AMERICA: A LITERARY DEBATE (Princeton Univ.
Press 1978); WILLIAM LEACH, LAND OF DESIRE: MERCHANTS, POWER, AND THE RISE OF A NEW
Seattle University Law Review
Notice that, i f  these three notions are as fundamental as I suggest,
ethics is not primarily concerned with concepts or with rules. Instead, it
is primarily concerned with the proper negotiation of a basic tension
within human consciousness that is lived but not necessarily explicitly or
focally noticed. As  beings capable of and called to self-transcendence,
we are in permanent tension, precariously poised between the selves that
we are and the selves that we could or should be. As  Aristotle observed,
most humans will what is noble, but choose what is advantageous.
23 O ras Bernard Lonergan notes, "self-transcendence involves tension be-
tween the self as transcending and the self as transcended. So  human
authenticity is never some pure and serene and secure possession. I t  is
ever a withdrawal from unauthenticity, and every successful withdrawal
only brings to light the need for still further withdrawals.'924
An approach to ethics centered on the three fundamental notions I
described improves on the standard model or paradigm of ethics by high-
lighting a number of  important features o f  ethical understanding and
practice. First, this approach to ethics is practical. One need not solve
all the protean theoretic quandaries of ethics, historicity, pluralism, rela-
tivism, anti-relativism, foundationalism, or anti-foundationalism in order
to make progress as an ethical human being any more than one need
know the physics of acceleration in order to drive faster on the freeway.
One need not know the fine points of the theory of subatomic particles in
order to avoid driving into macroscopic objects like telephone poles.
And one need not solve all the aporia of theoretical ethics in order to
make proximate and genuine progress in living a good or choiceworthy
life.
Second, ethics primarily concerns one's orientation in life. The ba-
sic unit of ethics is not the concept, the rule, or the dilemma; rather, it is
us and what we make of us. Not only do we cumulatively constitute our-
selves, but each choice or decision we make shifts the probabilities of
future choices or decisions—not only for ourselves, but also for the insti-
tutions within which we work and live.
25
AMERI CAN CULT URE  ( P ant heon B o o k s  1993 ) ;  I . J .  JACKSO N LE A R,  N o  P LA CE  O F  G RACE:
ANT1MODERNISM AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERI CAN CULT URE 1 8 8 0
-
1 9 2 0  ( U n i v .  o f  C h i -
cago Press 1994), especially pages 97-140.
23. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS *
1 1 6 2 1 ) 3 5  ( D a v i d  
R o s s ,  
J .  
L .  
A c k r i l l  
&  
J .  
a  
U r m s
o n
eds., 998).
24. See LONERGAN, supra note 18, at 110.
25. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 23, at *1114b30-1115a3 ("[Wje are in control of  our actions
from beginning to end, insofar as we know the particular circumstances surrounding them. But we
control only the beginning of our characteristics: the particular steps in their development are imper-
cept ible . . . . " ) ;  1 BERNARD LONERGAN, COLLECTED WORKS OF BERNARD iO NERG AN,  GRACE AND
FREEDOM: OPERATIVE G RACE I N THE THOUGHT OF ST.  THOMAS AQ UI NAS 55  ( Univ .  o f  T oront o
Press 1988) ("The human will does not swing back to a perfect equilibrium of  indifference with
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Third, while this way of conceiving ethics leaves room for relig-
iously based self-transcendence, faith is not a magic wand. L ik e any-
thing good, faith can be prostituted, domesticated, distorted, or turned
into something evil. For  though religious faith can produce extraordi-
nary flowerings of human excellence, such as Francis of Assisi, Teresa
of Avila, Dorothy Day, Gandhi, Martin Luther King, the Dalai Lama, it
can also serve as a vehicle by which "the fat relentless ego" confuses
itself with God in a condition traditionally known as spiritual pride and
traditionally regarded as one of the greatest evils. Historical and con-
temporary instances of "the many traps of religious aberration"
2b a r e  s u f -ficiently familiar, I think, to allow me to dispense with a bill of particu-
lars.
Fourth, unless one is a rationalist individualist, the project of be-
coming ethical is not an isolated, atotnistic process.
28 W e  d o  n o t  
r e fl e c t
on ethics, as though we were Robinson Crusoe stranded on s oi
-
ne d e s e r t
island of th  moral world. To he contrary, ethical reflection is inevitably
every tick of the clock; its past operations determine its present orientation, and though this orienta-
tion has not ,  absolute fixity .....St111 it is ebaracterized by the relative fixity of psychological eon-
- t i n u i t y . " ) ;  Patr ick Byrne, O n  Taking 'Responsibility f a r  t he Indeterminate Future, i n
PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE UNDERSTANDING OF HUMAN DESTINY: CURRENT CONTINENTAL
RESEARCHES 228-38 (Stephen Skousgaard ed,, LiniV_ Press of Am, 1980 ("To take responsibility
within the real universe, within a UniVerSC Whose future is indeterminate, we must assume responsi
.
-
bility for the shifts in probabilities which result from our actions.").
- 2 6 ,  See LONERGAN, supra note 18, at 110. •
- 2 7 . 1  would note that religious experience and development, like all human development, is
dialectical. See,  e.g,  BERNARD LONERGAN, Theology i n Its  New Context, i n A  SECOND
COLLECTION 67 (William F. Ryan and Bernard I  Tyrrell eds., Westminster Press 0974) Cl[F]or
religion is conversion in its preparation, in its occurrence, in its devolopnlent, i ' i
t  S  c o n s e q u e n t s ,  a n dalso, alas, i  its incompleteness, its failures, its breakdowns, its disintegration."). I  would also note
that the stock reductionist assumption that religion is best understood as infantile or neurotic guilt-
mongering Seems rather empirically4t Odds aivith the real" I  eligiously-inSpired is in devel op-
ment„
- A s  in other domains, so on in the domain of religion, infantile feats can outlast the time
of their inevitability. They can color or pervade or dominate in religious feelings of guilt.
But it does not at once follow, and it is not at once to be atsurned, that such fears retire-
' sent religious maturity and not religious retardation. One cannot simply ignore the fact
that, as religious people advance in the life of the spirit, fear gives place to love, and the
terrors of guilt yield to shame for one's lack of responsibill1y and sorrow for one's lack of
love.
17 BERNARD LON ER
-
GAN , 
S a c r a l i z a t
i o n  
a n d  
, t e c u l a
r i z a t i o
















LONERGAN, PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL PAPERS: 1 9 6 5
-
1 9 8 0 ,  a t  2 6 2
-
6 3  ( R o b e r t  
C r e e k e n  
&
Robert Doran eds., Univ. of Toronto Press 2004),
28. On the various forms of individualism, see Patrick Brown, Overcoming 'Inhumanly Inept'
Structures: Catholic Social Thought an 'Subsidiarity and the critique of  Bureaucracy, Law, and
Culture, 2 J. CATH. Soc. THOUGHT 413,41&-I9 (2005) Rationalist individualism is simply a form
of epistetnic individualism; its basic presupposition is that the significant locus of human knowing is
the individual rather than the community, the group, or the tradition. See id
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embedded in a tradition, even if it is only the tradition implicit in the lan-
guage one speaks.
29 A s  
S t a n l e y  
H a u e r
w a s  
n o t
e d ,
the justifications of our moral principles and assertions cannot be
done from the point of view of anyone, but rather [require] a tradi-
tion of moral wisdom. Such a tradition is not a 'deposit' of un-
changing moral 'truth,' but it is made up of the lives of men and
w men who are constantly testin
.
g a n d  
c h a n g i n g  
t h a t  
t r a d i t i o
n
through their own struggle to live it .
i°Stated otherwise, ethics and becoming ethical are at least partly matters
of reasonable belief.
FOUR LEVELS OF HAPPINESS AND A PLURALISM OF ENDS
Let me now flesh out the basic notions of ethics—orientation, self-
transcendence, and self-making or self-constituting—by discussing a
model that can help us understand the relation of religion, ethics, plural-
ism, and the law in a way that is both concrete and salutary. The model
is a descriptive heuristic. I t  is not an abstract, necessitarian ethical doc-
trine, concept, or set of premises. Rather, it forms an instance of what
Richard Bernstein has termed "engaged fallibilistic pluralism."
31 A sBernstein notes, "Such a pluralistic ethos places new responsibilities on
each of us. For it means taking our own fallibility seriously—resolving
that however much we are committed to our own styles of thinking, we
are willing to listen to others without denying or suppressing the other-
29. On tradition as an ineliminable component o f  ethical reflection, see ALASDAIR C.
MACI NT YRE,  AF T ER VIRTUE:  A  ST UDY I N MO RAL THEORY ( Duc k wor t h 1985) ,  es pec ial ly  chapt er
one (discussing the linguistic dimension of  ethical traditions), and ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE,
WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1989).
30. Stanley Hauerwas, On Keeping Theological Ethics Theological, in REVISIONS, CHANGING
PERspEcrivEs IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 19, at 33.
31.  RI CHARD J. BERNSTEIN,  T HE NEW  CONSTELLATION: T HE E T H I C A L
-
P O L I T I C A L  H O R I Z O N S
OF MODERNITY/POST-MODERNITY 336 (MIT Press 1992). The fallibilistic thesis is not entirely new
or uniquely post-modem; without glossing over the vast differences in historical context, it is fair to
say that both Aristotle and Aquinas (among other  philosophers) made similar points. S e e
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS *
1 0 9 4 1 ) 2 3
-
2 8  ( M a r t i n  
O s t w a l d  
t r a n s . ,  
B o b b s -





(a well-oriented person "is one who searches for that degree of precision in each kind of study which
the nature of the subject at hand admits: i t is obviously just as foolish to accept arguments of prob-
ability from a mathematician as to demand strict demonstration from an orator"); THOMAS AQUINAS,
COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE'S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 18 (CI. Litzinger trans., Regnery 1964)
("[Ciertitude cannot be found, nor should it be sought, in the same degree in all discussions where
we reason about anything. Likewise, the same method is not used in all products made by art; but
each workman works with the material in a way suited to that material N o w  the matter of moral
study is of such a nature that perfect certitude is not suitable to i t" ) ; id. ("Thus i t is evident that
moral matters are variable and divergent, not having the same certitude each time.").
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ness of the other."
32 T h e  
m o d e l  
h a s  
d e s c r




d i a l
e c t i





which might allow us to think critically about the plurality of ends for
which humans strive, including religious ends, and about the relations
between them.
It has to do, in other words, with that rare achievement of self-
transcendence, orientation, and self-constituting called self-knowledge.
Self-knowledge is not exactly irrelevant to ethics, legal education, or pro-
fessional practice. Indeed, for a professional formation process, claiming
Socrates as the inspiration for its pedagogical method, to lack any com-
ponent of self-knowledge would be, well, an injustice.
The three basic features of ethics I have been discussing find illus-
tration in a descriptive model articulated in Robert Spitzer's work on
business ethics.
33 I t  i s  
e l e g a
n t  
i n  
i t
s  
s i m p
l i c i
















plications. Spitzer's model is simply a skeletal structure of the pluralism
of human ends, goals, and purposes. I t  is verifiable in personal experi-
ence and confirmed, in various ways, by the historical traditions of phi-
losophy and by the scriptures of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism,
Buddhism, and other world religions.
34 Essentially, Spitzer contends that humans operate on, and are ori-
ented towards, four distinct but related levels of happiness. Each succes-
sive level embodies an increased increment of  self-transcendence, an
enlargement or deepening of orientation, and a higher stage in the self-
constituting inherent in ethical reflection and decision. O n a first level,
we are spontaneously oriented to the kind of happiness that comes from
32. BERNsTE1N, supra note 31, at 336. Again, this notion is not entirely new. See ARISTOTLE,
supra note 23, at *1134b-1135a; AQUINAS, supra note 31, at 18 ("Regarding [virtuous works] there
are no agreed opinions, but rather a decided difference is found in what men judge about them. I n
this matter, a variety of  errors occur, for certain actions, considered just and good by some, are
looked upon as unjust and bad by others according to different times and places and persons. Now a
deed is considered vicious at one time and in one country, but at a different time and in a different
country it is not considered to be so."); AUGUSTINE, TEACHING CHRISTIANITY 144 (New City Press
1995) ("All good and true Christians should understand that truth, wherever they may find it, be-
longs to their God.").
33.  ROBERT J. SPITZER, T HE SPIRIT OF LEADERSHIP: OPTIMIZING CREATIVITY AND CHANGE IN
ORGANIZATIONS 75-124 (Executive Excellence Publ'g 2000).
34. Because it is, broadly speaking, emergentist rather than reductionist, Spitzer's model is
contrary to the philosophy-disguised-as-science known as "scientism" and its corollary reduction-
ism. For  a critique of scientism from the point of view of the history of religions, see SMITH, supra
note 13, especially chapters 1-4 and chapters 8-14. For  a rigorous philosophical critique of scien-
t ism,  see I O  ERIC VOEGELIN, T he O r igins  o f  Scient ism,  in COLLECTED WORKS OF ERIC VOEGELIN,
PUBLISHED ESSAYS: 1940-1952, at 168-96 (Ellis Sandoz ed., Univ. of  Miss. Press 2000). F or  a
rigorous critique o f  reductionism, see chapters three and four  i n 3  BERNARD LONERGAN,
COLLECTED W O RKS OF BERNARD LONERGAN,  INSIGHT:  A  ST UDY OF HUM A N UNDERST ANDI NG
(Frederick E. Crowe & Robert M. Doran eds., Univ. of Toronto Press 1992) (discussing the world-
view of "emergent probability" as a necessary consequence of the complementarity of classical and
statistical heuristic structures in modem science).
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immediate gratification. Examples abound, of course, but one can think
of basic aesthetic pleasures such as chocolate, lattes, wine, music, poetry,
painting, laughter, and other more or less immediate sources of various
kinds of pleasure. O n a second level, we are spontaneously oriented to
the kind of happiness that comes from ego-gratification. Again, exam-
ples are many, but one can think of the happiness that comes from per-
sonal achievement, successful competition, social recognition, and hon-
or.
On a third level, we are spontaneously oriented to the kind of hap-
piness that comes from contributing to some good beyond oneself. Here
one can think of the kind of happiness that comes from being a member
of a community, whether it be a friendship, relationship, or marriage; a
team, a working group, or a group with specialized skills and aims, such
as a scholarly community; or a local, national, or international social or
cultural community Mak ing a contribution to a good beyond oneself
involves a distinct form of happiness or experienced fulfillment, different
in kind and not essentially reducible to immediate or ego-gratification.
Such a contribution involves us in self-transcending affects such as grati-
tude, friendship,
35 a n d  
a  
s e n s e  
o f  
c o m m








O  a fourth level, we are spontaneously oriented to the kind of hap-
piness or fulfillment that comes from being involved with something of
ultimate significance. According to Spitzer, humans "are not only inter-
ested in what is concrete and immediate, they want to be involved in
something of ultimate, permanent, absolute, unconditional, and even in-
finite significance. I t  is not enough to experience a concrete truth. We
would like to have a sense of ultimate Truth."
36 T h i s  i s  t h e  
d i s t i n c t i v e
level of appiness or fulfillment that people of faith associate with living
and prac icing their faith.
37 O n e  
c a n  
t h i n k  
o f  




l e v e





gressive enlargements of  the horizon of  the particular individual who
experiences them.
This is all simple enough, and volumes more could be, and have
been, written about each level. The levels are themselves multi-leveled,
and each is less like a simple discrete category and more like an inner
35. One can correlate these levels with various accounts of virtue. The relationship of friend-
ship to ethics and political community, for example, is part of the classical tradition in philosophical
and theological ethics. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, supra note 23, at *1155a-1172a (on the relation of
friendship to ethics); see also DONALD X. BURT, FRIENDSHIP AND SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO
AUGUSTINE'S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY (William B. Eerdmans Publ'g 1999).
36. SPITZER, supra note 33, at 81. The most helpful scholarly introductions to the fourth level
that I am aware of include the article by Friedrich Heiler, supra note 20, and chapter 4 on "Religion"
in LONERGAN, supra note 18, at 101-24.
37. Chapter 4 on "Religion" in LONERGAN, supra note 18, at 101-24, also provides a much
more ample, nuanced, and dialectical account of  the fourth level. See also PAUL WOODRUFF,
REVERANCE: RENEWING A FORGOTTEN VIRTUE (Oxford Univ. Press 2002).
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continent. The scheme has many precedents in the history of philosophy,
notably Kierkegaard's delineation of three levels of existential subjectiv-
ity: the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious.
38 Y e t  S p i t z e r ' s  
m o d e l
possesses a descriptive clarity that other models of the different traditions
of phil sophical thics can lack.
This clarity gives the model a unique relevance for the problem of
pluralism in ethics, for it anchors ethical discernment in the concrete and
verifiable experience of the individual person without holding ethics hos-
tage to a superficial relativism or skepticism. I t  helps the individual
identify the normative dynamics of  self-transcendence already present
within her own experience without simply imposing a doctrinaire set of
extrinsic rules or concepts. I n  other words, the analytic power of Spitz-
er's model stems from (1) its open-textured minimalism, which is open
to a large plurality of concrete and even conflicting understandings, (2)
its description of the relation of the levels to one another, and (3) its im-
plications for what Iris Murdoch holds is the subject of ethics, namely,
the overcoming or transcendence of the ego. I  will discuss each of these
advantages in turn.
First, the model does not presuppose any particular scheme of eva-
luating or valorizing the four levels of happiness as levels. Each level is
simply a spontaneous orientation that has to be guided forward by appro-
priate developments and differentiations. Each is open and thus pluralist;
in other words, each is open to all the variant understandings of different
cultural or  historical traditions. F o r  example, Buddhism, Hinduism,
Confucianism, and Islam conceive of the third and fourth levels in differ-
ent ways,
39 
a n d  
u t i l i
t a r i

























third level in different ways.
Second, the descriptive-evaluative component comes from the rela-
tions between the levels. According to Spitzer, taken together, the levels
are integral. Not only are they levels of happiness to which we are spon-
taneously oriented, they are levels of personal identity as well. Thus, one
has an aesthetic identity, an ego identity, a contributive identity, and an
identity based on the degree of one's affective and effective orientation
into transcendent mystery. The higher levels incorporate or sublate but
do not replace the lower levels. Each level has its own distinctive role or
function, and the functioning of the higher levels complements and com-
pletes and contextualizes the lower levels. B y  the same token, i f  the
higher levels are truncated or ignored, the lower levels become distorted
38. See SOREN KIERKEGAARD, EITHER/OR: A FRAGMENT OF LIFE (George L. Strengren trans.,
Steven L. Ross ed., Harper & Row 1986) (1843).
39. See, e.g., WILLIAM THEODORE DE BARY, ASIAN VALUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A
CONFUCIAN COMMUNITAIUAN PERSPECTIVE 58
-
89  ( H a r v a r d  
U n i v .  
P r e s s  
1 9 9 8 ) .
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versions of themselves. An orientation to pleasure or ego achievement is
one thing in the context of the full spectrum of happiness; it is another
thing, however, i f  the sublating orientations implic it in the third and
fourth levels are ignored or denied.
• T h u s ,  i f  1 acknowledge (and therefore live on or out of) only the
first two levels, my psychic center will be off-center. For  from within
- this truncated stance, on the psychological level,
I tend to locate my center in myself I  act as if '  were the hub of the
world and I intend (direct myself) toward all other things and per-
sons from that central place. A l l  others are seen from this van-
tage point. A l l  others are evaluated from this standard. A l l  others
are means to my ends as praarnatie goals of my free subjectivity
. All others are enjoyed depending on the value of their qualities to
s a t i s f y  my needs as an organic and psychological consumerSimlary, onthevf"g-cdsatisfaction of
needs, rather than bringing happiness, tends to be greedy and addictive,




i v l o r e
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e l l i
g e n




















the level of  knowing, rny ego-centered intelligence, rather than under-
standing others, tends to be arrogant and obsessive, self-righteous in
judgments of others and defensive against their calling my ego into ques-
tiond'
42 This downwardly-directed dynamic o f  selft-tmneation and self-
- alienation is also illustrated by Spitzer's extended analysis of what he
calls 'the comparison game,”
43 w h o s e  
s p o n t a n e o u
s l y  
d e s t r u c
t i v e  
t e n d
e n -
cies occur when one's identity and search for happiness stalls on the sec-
ond level. I n  the comparison game, everything one does is centered on
whether it  enhances his or her comparative advantage or comparative
ranking vis-a-vis others. Spitzer devotes an entire chapter to analyzing
the pervasive and destructive effects that this has on organizational effec-
tiveness and esprit de cotps. While I cannot enter into a detailed discus-
sion of that here, I  would suggest that his analysis of the comparison
game provides a remarkable diagnostic technique for evaluating the pa-
40. GEORGE KUNZ, THE PARADOX OF POWER AN WEAKNESS: LEVINAS AND AN
ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM OF PSYCHOLOGY 110 (State Univ. of Ni.̒ (. Press 1998). Although Kunz is
not drawing on Spitzer's model, his account is remarkably consonant with it. As  a Levinasian psy-
chologist, Kunz's description of the Gyges Complex, the Zeus Complex, and the Narcissus Complex
fits hand-in-glove with Spitzer's description of  the pathologies that can occur when the third and
fourth levels of happiness/identity get ignored, displaced, or occluded. Similarly, the whole post-
modern emphasis on the Other fills out and concretizes what Spitzer means by the third level.
41.M at 111.
42. Id at 110.
43. SPITZER, supyra note 8 9 - 1 2 3 .
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thologies that haunt law schools and law firms. I n  addition, Spitzer's
analysis has remarkable affinities with Rene Girard's notion of "mimetic
rivalry?'" Girard's analysis identifies envy as a central form of distorted
human desire for the good and for happiness, and one simply cannot
adequately discuss the central problem of ethics—the "ego and t h e
techniques ( if any) for its d e f e a f '
4 5
— w i t h o u t  
i d e n t i f y i n g  
t h e s e  
d y n a m i c
s .
This destructive dynamic of the comparison game, then, is precisely
what plays itself out for students in law school and lawyers in law firms.
When I teach Spitzer's text in my ethics course, law students immedi-
ately recognize it  as naming and describing with remarkable accuracy
one of  the things they find most difficult and painful about the law
school experience. Similarly, lawyers in practice recognize the compari-
son game as one of the main pathologies stalking the contemporary prac-
tice of law.
Stated otherwise, while Spitzer's model identifies the normative
dynamics implicit in the human quest for happiness on each of the four
different levels, it also leaves room for diagnosing the biases that may
attend each level. An  exclusive orientation to the first and second levels
can leave a person the victim of a conscious or unconscious egoistic bias
which makes the individual self and its interests the manipulative center
of everything. Similarly, an orientation to the good beyond oneself can
become arrested by the group bias of the relevant community. Finally,
the orientation to both the common good and to transcendent faith can be
distorted by the biases of the lower levels and may even intensify them.
The levels of happiness can also become captured by cultural bi-
ases. The hypertrophic individualism of American culture tends to make
the third level seem implausible; the reflexive skepticism of law school
culture guts the possibilities of  higher orientation offered by both the
third and fourth levels; and human living then settles down into a deca-
dent routine of  competing egos struggling for status and recognition.
The resulting situation in legal practice is not exactly conducive to either
professionalism or an ethos of justice. Mainly, it is conducive to making
the world of legal practice seem pretty much like Hobbes' description of
pre-civil society as "the war of all against all.”
46
44. See, e.g., RENE GIRARD, A THEATER OF ENVY: WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE (Oxford Univ.
Press 1991); see also chapter 3 in EUGENE WEBB, THE SELF BETWEEN: FROM FREUD TO THE NEW
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF FRANCE (Univ. of  Wash. Press 1993), describing Girard's treatment of
"mimetic rivalry."
45. See Murdoch, On 'God' and 'Good,' supra note 19, at 72.
46. THOMAS HoBBEs, LEVIATHAN 100 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Collier 1962) (1651).
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V. CONCLUSION
All of this is perhaps simply a way of saying that the ethical and re-
ligious horizons of law students should not simply be ignored, anesthe-
tized, or—by implication, atmosphere, or dogma—denied or denigrated
by legal education. Legal education should cultivate an ethos of justice
and not just technical proficiency in legal mechanics. N or  should we
ignore the resources that faith or ethics in the form of orientation, self-
transcendence, and self-constituting might offer in the struggle against
the deformation of professionalism in the practice of law.
47 W h i l e  t h e r eare indeed "many traps of religious aberration,"
48 w e  c a n n o t  
s i m p l y  i g -
nore the fact that developed forms of religious self-transcendence (that is
to say, those which are not merely hostage to or captured by the first two
levels of happiness) contribute to the possibility of liberation from ego-
compulsion and make possible increased contributions to a common
good.
In other words, because genuine religious faith has the potential to
partially dethrone or displace "the fat relentless ego," it can inspire sus-
tained self-transcendence in the service of justice; it  can work for the
betterment of humankind in all sorts of concrete and sustained ways—
even in the face of seemingly hopeless odds; and it can help make life in
the practice of law something other than a Hobbsean "war of all against
all," or a Girardian nightmare of mimetic rivalry, 49 or a Sartrean world in
which "hell is other lawyers."" Genuine religious faith opposes warring
egoisms, resists the hell of  an envy-based and ego-built world. I t  can
contribute to turning life right-side-up again; it can help us to do and to
become something other than "the complete opposite o f  what we
ought."
51
47. See Lawrence, supra note 4. See also Debra Cassens Weis, Narcissists with Big Egos Lead
Many Law Firms, Consultant Says, ABA  JOURNAL, Nov. 11, 2008, httm//www.abajoumal.
coin/news/narcissists with_big_egos jead_many Jaw_firms_consultant_saysi.
48. See LONERGAN, supra note 18, at 110.
49. See EUGENE WEBB, supra note 44.
50. See JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, No EXIT 52 (Paul Bowles trans., Samuel French 1958) (1944)
("Hell is just—other people.").
51. See PLATO, supra note 2, at *481. For  an extraordinary evocation of the power of faith to
mitigate or reverse social evils, see the materials (especially the videos) on the 2008 Opus Prize
winners, Marguerite Barankitse, Krishnammal Jagannathan, and Michael Woodard, available at:
http://www.seattleu.edu/opusprizei.
